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Abstract
Reverse share tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to richer
tenants on shares, is a common phenomenon. Yet it does not fit ex-
isting theoretical models of sharecropping and has never before been
modeled in the economics literature. We explain share tenancy con-
tracts using an asset risk model that incorporates Marshallian ineffi-
ciency and thereby provides a credible explanation for share tenancy
more broadly, reverse tenancy included. When choosing the terms of
an agrarian contract, the landlord considers the impact of her choice
on the probability that she will retain future rights to the rented land.
Thus, this model captures the effect of tenure insecurity and property
rights on agrarian contracts. Among the main testable implications
of the theoretical model are that, as property rights become more se-
cure, reverse tenancy tends to disappear and that kin contracts tend
to make share tenancy more likely.
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1 Introduction
Sharecropping, an agrarian contract by which a landlord leases out land to
a tenant in exchange for a share of the crop, has long been studied by social
scientists in general and by economists in particular. The canonical explana-
tion for the existence of sharecropping, following Cheung (1969) and Stiglitz
(1974), is that share tenancy matches a relatively richer landlord in a better
position to absorb production risk with a tenant who, as a residual claimant
on the output, has the proper incentives not to shirk. Sharecropping could
thereby dominate both fixed rent contracts that were considered too risky by
the tenant and wage contracts that would predictably lead to underprovision
of effort by the tenant.
Of course, not every sharecropping contract fits the above stylized facts.
We are especially interested in situations of reverse share tenancy, in which a
relatively poorer landlord contracts with a relatively richer tenant. These sit-
uations do not fit the canonical model of sharecropping because the poorer
landlord no longer holds comparative advantage in risk bearing over the
tenant. Indeed, none of the extant published models of sharecropping are
consistent with the oft-observed phenomenon of reverse share tenancy. Note
that we distinguish “reverse share tenancy” from “reverse tenancy”, the lat-
ter term being somewhat confusing since it could refer to both fixed rent and
sharecropping contracts.
In this paper, we present a theoretical model of reverse share tenancy as it is
being practiced in Madagascar. Since the poorer landlord can neither sell her
land nor exploit it herself, she rents out to a richer tenant on a share tenancy
contract. We hypothesize that imperfectly secure land rights motivate reverse
share tenancy. As under the canonical sharecropping model, if the landlord
were to hire the tenant on a wage labor contract, moral hazard would lead
to labor shirking. The innovation we introduce is that if the landlord were to
rent out her land on a fixed rent contract, she would face an increased prob-
ability of losing her claim on the land. In much of rural Madagascar, local
custom holds that taking possession of the fruits of the land ensures con-
tinued access to the land, much as direct cultivation of the land does under
more traditional Lockean property rights. Under such conditions, the incen-
tive to reduce asset risk motivates reverse tenancy sharecropping, replacing
the traditional incentive that arises due to the landlords superior capacity to
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bear yield risk. This asset risk explanation could explain any sharecropping
in areas with insecure land rights, not just reverse share tenancy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the
literatures on sharecropping and on reverse share tenancy. Section 3 develops
the theoretical model and presents the main results. In section 4, we discuss
our model in relation to property rights in Madagascar. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 The Literature on Sharecropping
The sharecropping literature dates back to Adam Smith’s An Inquiry into
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776, 1957), who observed
that share tenancy was an unsatisfactory arrangement between slavery and
the English (or fixed rent) system, that tenants had virtually no incentive
to make improvements to the land under a sharecropping contract, and that
issues of moral hazard were likely to arise. It then took close to a century
and a half for economists to “discover” sharecropping again. Marshall (1920),
in the eighth and last edition of his Principles of Economics, applied a rig-
orous, diagrammatic, marginal analysis to the phenomenon and concluded
that, given the prohibitive cost to the landlord of enforcing the tenant’s ef-
fort, tenants will equate the marginal product of their labor to the marginal
income they get from their share of the crop. Thus, Marshall argued that the
landlord could do strictly better by signing a fixed rent contract by which
she extracts the entire surplus. This kind of moral hazard is referred to as
“Marshallian inefficiency”.
Cheung (1968) noted that the tenant’s surplus observed in a Marshallian
equilibrium was inconsistent with the notion of a competitive equilibrium. He
thus took a different view, assuming that the tenant’s effort was costlessly en-
forceable. He also assumed that landlords choose the number of tenants with
whom they contract, which allows the former to bind the latter to their reser-
vation utility. Cheung (1969) then discussed without much formalism that, in
presence of both agricultural risk and transaction costs, sharecropping might
emerge as the dominant tenurial arrangement. Stiglitz (1974) picks up where
Cheung (1969) had left off by focusing on risk-sharing and the incentive ef-
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fects of sharecropping. By exploring in turn what happens when the labor
supply is inelastic and when the labor supply can vary, he obtains a series of
results, two of which are striking: (i) under certain circumstances, i.e., when
both parties can mix contracts, sharecropping becomes redundant; and (ii)
under other, particular circumstances, effort will not be underprovided, i.e.,
there is no Marshallian inefficiency, and sharecropping contracts are efficient.
Newbery’s (1977) contribution takes Stiglitz (1974) a step further by focusing
solely on the risk-sharing effects of sharecropping contracts. He demonstrates
that sharecropping is irrelevant when agricultural risk is the only risk that
exists, but that when another type of risk enters the picture (a plausible
assumption as regards agriculture in developing countries), sharecropping
becomes the dominant tenurial arrangement. Our model follows in the spirit
of Newbery by introducing multiple sources of risk, in our case asset risk in
addition to production yield risk.
The above key references, like the rest of the economic-theoretic literature
on sharecropping, cannot explain the emergence of reverse share tenancy.
Assuming agents do not exhibit increasing absolute risk-aversion, the conjec-
tured dominance of sharecropping in the canonical, Cheung-Stiglitz-Newbery
tradition depends fundamentally on a relatively rich landlord who has a com-
parative advantage in risk-bearing or credit access and a relatively poorer
tenant who has a comparative advantage in labor supervision due to moral
hazard. Based on this, the economic-theoretic literature on sharecropping
inherently fails to explain reverse share tenancy.1
2.2 The Literature on Reverse Tenancy
The literature on reverse share tenancy is small and purely empirical, consist-
ing almost solely of case studies. Lawry (1993) presents a case study of land
tenure in Lesotho, Lyne and Thomson (1995) review land use in KwaZulu,
South Africa, and Colin and Bouquet (2001) discuss the a medias (or fifty-
fifty) arrangement in the Mexican Sierra Madre. There is likewise scattered
evidence that the phenomenon of reverse share tenancy is on the rise in
1The reader interested in more complete reviews of the literature on sharecropping can
consult Singh (1989) and Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami (1992).
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India (most notably Punjab and Haryana2, but also in West Bengal) and
in the Philippines (Roumasset, 2002). Two focal points seem to emerge of
Lawry (1993) and Lyne and Thomson (1995): landlord households are typi-
cally headed by a single, older woman, i.e., a woman that is either divorced
or widowed, and tenant households are typically headed by a younger man.3
But none of these studies provide a sound theoretical explanation for the
reverse share tenancy phenomenon. All of them are merely descriptive in
nature and extant agrarian contract theory would predict reverse fixed rent
tenancy, not share tenancy.
Given the seeming frequency with which reverse share tenancy occurs and
the absence of any clear theory to explain its existence, there seems to be
value in providing a theoretical model of reverse sharecropping that is con-
sistent with the phenomenon of reverse share tenancy. This way, agrarian
policy on a reasonably common phenomenon might be founded on a clear
understanding of the institution’s raison d’eˆtre. Such an understanding is
essential if policymakers are to anticipate correctly how changes in key ex-
ogenous parameters, such as the legality of share contracts, access to rural
credit, or security of land tenure, are likely responses to affect agricultural
production and the welfare of poorer farmers.
Our work is motivated by field observations in Madagascar, where sharecrop-
ping was declared illegal in the early 1970s based on the perception that it led
to agreements between relatively rich landlords and relatively poor tenants,
and that this in turn could lead to exploitation in the context of what Breman
(1974) refers to as a “patron-client” relationship. Sharecropping nonetheless
continues in Madagascar, comprising more than half of all land rentals, ac-
cording to the most recent available data (Minten and Razafindraibe, 2003).
Moreover, anecdotal evidence and our own visits to numerous small farms in
rural Madagascar confirm the presence of reverse share tenancy and limited
survey evidence suggests that landlords are, on average, less educated, poorer
and more likely female than tenants. Jarosz (1991), referring to the Lac Alao-
tra, Madagascar’s main rice-producing region, notes that “(...) sharecroppers
are not solely landless or nearly landless peasants; members of the wealthy
2India’s Economic and Political Weekly has mentioned this a few times. We thank Kei
Otsuka for pointing this out.
3The same focal points seem to be true in India. We thank Clive Bell for pointing this
out.
5
and middle classes also sharecrop the land of others. These landowners are
generally smallholders, poor or middle-class farmers who are indebted, el-
derly, female or the descendants of former slaves”. Jarosz also notes how
landowners who enter sharecropping agreements are often married women
who have inherited land near their ancestral villages and then have moved
away to live near their husband’s village, divorced women, widows, etc. She
also adds that poor landlords who own land will have middle-income or rich
farmers as tenants, or even urban people. This is because landlords typically
lack the financial or physical capital to cultivate their land themselves.
The theory that follows is thus motivated by the reasonably widespread prac-
tice of reverse share tenancy in a nation where the overwhelming majority
of the poor are small farmers, the poor systematically have weaker property
rights in land than the rich (Randrianarisoa and Minten, 2001; Minten and
Razafindraibe, 2003), and stimulating agricultural productivity is universally
recognized as crucial to poverty reduction. One needs a coherent theory of
the reverse share tenancy phenomenon in order to answer practical policy
questions such as whether a ban on share tenancy is relevant, what are the
likely consequences of land tenure changes, and how might the welfare of
poor land-owning households be increased?
3 The Model
Let ht denote the landlord’s land holding at time t, α ∈ [0, 1− ] be the share
of the crop that goes to the landlord as part of the sharecropping agreement,
β ∈ R be a side payment from the richer tenant to the poorer landlord,
and δ ∈ (0, 1) be the landlord’s discount factor.4 We assume α = 1 to be
impossible, which is equivalent to assuming that the landlord cannot borrow
interseasonally in order to become an owner-operator and hire tenants – wage
laborers – at a fixed wage. In this setting, we want to know when a poorer
landowner will rent out her land to a richer tenant on shares instead of a
fixed rent contract.
4The parameter  is a (potentially very small) positive number in the (0, 1) interval
included for purely technical reasons to bound the results in order that we can use a
simpler model that excludes the fixed wage contract option.
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Further, we assume that the landlord cannot sell her land. This is empir-
ically motivated by the fact that very often in Madagascar and elsewhere,
the poor have incomplete or insecure claims over land held under customary
tenure. Because rights are incomplete or insecure, land sales are uncommon
and assumed away in this analysis. This model is appropriate only for places
with some degree of tenurial insecurity such that land sales are effectively
infeasible.
As regards land, we make
Assumption 1 Let the expected law of motion for land be E(ht+1) = ρ(α)ht.
In Assumption 1, the function ρ(α) is an asset security parameter. Equiva-
lently, 1− ρ(α) is the risk of asset-loss due to tenure insecurity in the land.
Small farmers in several different sites in rural Madagascar have told us over
the past decade that if their claim to a parcel of land is at all insecure, in
the sense that it could be repossessed by the community and given to a dif-
ferent farmer or that they could lose their land to a squatter in a dispute,
then their customary claim to the land is enhanced if they are observed to
receive and retain part of the crop from the parcel. This seems to reflect some
sense of the household’s dependence on the parcel for its food security – and
communities are loathe to damage members’ food security – a quasi-Lockean
property right, wherein receiving the fruit of the land is treated similarly to
working it directly, or both. The origin and motive of this perception are not
the object of our study. We take these as given. We therefore make
Assumption 2 Let ρ′(α) > 0, i.e., asset security (risk) is strictly increasing
(decreasing) in the share of the output received as rent.
Note that tenure insecurity, observed in conjunction with reverse share ten-
ancy, is seemingly not exclusive to Madagascar. The proceedings of an IFPRI
(2002) conference also mention that “[a]t present, the laws in most Indian
states do not permit tenancy of that type. Reverse tenancy is taking place
without solid legal backing. Those who lease out land are at risk of losing
ownership of that land”.
We then make
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Assumption 3 Let the landlord’s utility function u(pit) be a bounded, strictly
increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable function of
profit at time t, pit.
The concavity assumption implies that the landlord is risk averse. The share-
cropping literature typically assumes that the landlord is risk neutral and the
tenant risk averse. It seems reasonable to assume that the landlord is indeed
risk averse, irrespective of the wealth ordering between landlord and tenant.
The landlord’s profit at time t is a function of land, such that:
pit = αtf(kt, `t, ht) + βt − ct, (1)
where f(kt, `t, ht) is the agricultural output as a function of capital, labor and
land at time t, respectively, such that f ′(·) > 0, f ′′(·) < 0 and f is bounded;
The parameter βt is the side payment – the fixed rent if it is positive or, if
negative, a cash wage – from the tenant to the landlord; and ct ≥ 0 subsumes
the various costs borne by the landlord. For simplicity, we assume that the
landlord possesses no input other than land, i.e., the tenant possesses both
capital and labor inputs, as seems typical from the extant literature. In order
for the reverse tenancy sharecropping contract to be individually rational, the
landlord must derive non-negative profit from the agreement.
In order to account for moral hazard we make
Assumption 4 Let `t = `(αt), where `
′(·) < 0 and `′′(·) > 0. That is, there
is Marshallian inefficiency.
This does not mean that the tenant’s labor input is a choice variable of the
landlord via her choice of crop share. Rather, we use this as a shortcut to cap-
ture the agency problem associated with a tenant’s discretionary allocation
of imperfectly observable labor effort without having to model that choice
as well. In practice, the landlord might just be aware that her choice to take
a greater share of harvest as rent will generally decrease the tenant’s labor
effort.
Note that for simplicity, we only assume traditional moral hazard instead of
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assuming both traditional and technical moral hazard.5 This does not make
much difference, as our main results would only be strengthened by assuming
both traditional and technical moral hazard.
Thus, the landlord’s problem is to
max
{αt,βt}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
t=0
δtu(pit) s.t. E(ht+1) = ρ(α)ht given h0 > 0. (2)
The Bellman equation for equation (2), or its dynamic programming version,
is such that:
V (h) = max{u(pi) + δEV (h′)} s.t. E(h′) = ρ(α)h given h > 0. (3)
We drop the subscript in equation (3) given that the sequential problem
is reduced to only two periods – now and tomorrow – by the principle of
optimality. Thus, h denotes the landlord’s land now and h′ denotes the land-
lord’s land in the future. Let us now assume that the landlord’s utility func-
tion or returns function, in dynamic programming terms, takes the canonical
DARA/CRRA form:
Assumption 5 Let u(pit) = ln(pit) = ln[αtf(kt, `(αt), ht) + βt − ct].
Given that the landlord’s profit is bounded by assumption6, the function
u(·) is also bounded, and we have assumed that it is continuous, strictly
increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable. Thus, the
landlord’s dynamic programming problem is
V (h) = max
α,β
{ln[αf(k, `(α), h) + β − c] + δEV (h′)}
s.t. E(h′) = ρ(α)h, h > 0. (4)
5Traditional moral hazard refers to situations where the agent underprovides labor
or, more generally, effort. Technical moral hazard refers to situations where the agent
underprovides capital or chooses a production technique which is not optimal from the
principal’s point of view.
6Assuming that the agricultural output is bounded, then the landlord’s profit is
bounded.
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Note that because β enters the landlord’s profit linearly, by strict mono-
tonicity of her preferences, she will always seek to set β at the highest possi-
ble value, while still satisfying the tenant’s individual rationality constraint,
which we omit here in the interest of brevity.7
Thus, β = β(α), where β′(·) < 0 and | β′(α) |< f(k, `(α), h). That is, the
contract trades off cash for in kind rent and rent cannot exceed the value of
the crop, otherwise the contract would not be optimal.
The problem can then be reduced to:
V (h) = max
α
{ln[αf(k, `(α), h) + β(α)− c] + δEV (h′)}
s.t. E(h′) = ρ(α)h, h > 0. (5)
The first-order condition for equation (5) implies that under the optimal
contract
f(k, `(α∗), h) + α∗f ′(k, `(α∗), h)`′(α∗) + β′(α∗)
α∗f(k, `(α∗), h) + β(α∗)− c = −δEV
′(h′)ρ′(α∗)h (6)
In light of the assumptions we have made thus far, the value function V (·)
is strictly increasing. Consequently, the value of owning a plot of size h for a
landlord who behaves optimally from now on is strictly increasing in the
amount of land owned. Therefore, the right-hand side of equation (6) is
strictly negative, which allows us to state the following:
7We use an implied principal-agent formulation here for the sake of simplicity and
consistency with the extant sharecropping literature. As Bell (1989) notes, it is likely that
tenants also enjoy welfare gains from sharecropping contracts. This may be especially
true when tenants are wealthier, and thus probably more powerful than, landlords. The
intuition and qualitative results of our model carry over to the more complex bargaining
theoretic framework necessary to derive mutual gains from sharecropping.
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Proposition 1 (Existence) Under Assumptions 1 through 5, sharecrop-
ping emerges as the optimal contract. That is, α∗ > 0 and β = β(α∗) is set
so as to maximize the landlord’s profit from the contract while maintaining
the tenant at his reservation utility level.
Proof 1 Suppose not, i.e., suppose α∗ = 0. Then, evaluating equation (6) at
α∗ = 0 yields
f(k, `(0), h) + β′(0)
β(0)− c = −δEV
′(h′)ρ′(0)h (7)
But then, the right-hand side of equation (7) is negative given our assump-
tions, and the numerator on the left-hand side is necessarily positive. Since
the denominator must be nonnegative for this to be an optimal contract,
α∗ > 0.
We can also state the following as regards the comparative statics of the
model, which gives us the usual testable implications:
Conjecture 1 (Comparative Statics) Under Assumptions 1 through 5,
the share of the crop that goes to the landlord should be increasing in the cost
borne by the landlord.That is, ∂α
∂c
≥ 0.
We conjecture this rather than include it in the following proposition given
that it is not immediately obvious that ∂α
∂c
≥ 0. To see this, note that
∂α
∂c
=
δEV ′(h′)ρ′(α)h
f(k, `(α), h)δEV ′(h′)ρ′(α)h+ f ′(k, `(α), h)`′(α)
. (8)
In the above equation, the numerator is strictly positive, but the denominator
is not necessarily positive given that the second term is negative. Intuitively,
the share of the crop that goes to the landlord as rent should be increasing
in the cost borne by the landlord, but proving this would require a technical
assumption which would be difficult to justify.
11
Proposition 2 (Comparative Statics) Under Assumptions 1 through 5,
the share of the crop that goes to the landlord is strictly decreasing in the
amount of capital provided by the tenant. Further, the output is decreasing
in the crop share. That is, ∂α
∂k
< 0, and ∂f
∂α
< 0.
Proof 2 We prove this directly using the partial derivatives of α with respect
to k and of f(·) with respect to α:
∂α
∂k
=
−f ′(k, `(α), h)
[f(k, `(α), h)δEV ′(h′)ρ′(α)h+ f ′(k, `(α), h)`′(α)]2
−[f ′(k, `(α), h)δEV ′(h′)ρ′(α)h+ f ′′(k, `(α), h)`′(α)]
[f(k, `(α), h)δEV ′(h′)ρ′(α)h+ f ′(k, `(α), h)`′(α)]2
< 0 (9)
Further,
∂f
∂α
= f ′(k, `(α), h)`′(α). (10)
Proposition 2 confirms familiar, intuitive results. The optimal share and falls
as the tenant’s capital contributions, k, grow, and since the tenant’s labor
effort decreases in the share of the crop accruing to the landlord, output,
f(·), necessarily moves inversely with α.
This moral hazard effect is standard in the literature. Yet it may not be as
serious a problem as commonly thought if the landlord and tenant interact
repeatedly over time — a standard folk theorem result — or if the tenant
feels altruistically toward the landlord. Both factors may prevail in kin-based
contracts.8
If kin-based contracts (denoted by the superscript o) obviate Marshallian
inefficiency, i.e. if we no longer impose Assumption 4, we get
8Sadoulet, de Janvry and Fukui (1997) find that moral hazard plays much less of a role
in contracts among kin than in non-kin contracts. Survey evidence suggests that as much
as 40 percent of sharecropping contracts are kin-based in Madagascar, and we intend to
test for this in our upcoming research.
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Proposition 3 (Kin Contracts) Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 5, i.e., in
kin-based contracts, since Marshallian inefficiency is obviated, sharecropping
becomes more likely. That is, α∗ < αo = 1− .
Proof 3 Because there is no Marshallian inefficiency under kin-based con-
tracts, f(k, `(αo), h) > f(k, `(α∗), h), which implies that a landlord holding
her tenant to his reservation utility level will take the whole of gain, neces-
sarily implying an increase in the optimal share.
This model hinges on the existence of insecure land rights that are affected
by the distribution of the harvest. This implies that tenure security will affect
the existence of reverse share tenancy contracts. This leads to
Proposition 4 (Property Rights) As property rights become secure, i.e.,
under Assumptions 1, 3, 4 and 5 with ρ(α) = 1 and ρ′(α) = 0, the landlord
will switch from a sharecropping agreement to a fixed rent contract in non-
kin contracts, thus moving from a second- to a first-best solution. That is,
when ρ(α) = 1, α = 0. In kin-based contracts, when property rights are
secure, fixed rent and sharecropping contracts are both first-best, thus making
sharecropping irrelevant.
Proof 4 This is simply a Newbery-type result: when there exists only one
type of risk, in this case moral hazard, then sharecropping agreements become
irrelevant. To see this, note that if ρ(α) = 1, then a risk averse landlord does
strictly better by leaving all of the crop to the non-kin tenant and extracting
the whole surplus by setting β(α) = β(0) at the value which will maximize
her profit while maintaining the tenant at his reservation level of utility. In
the kin-based contract with no moral hazard, there is no longer any risk or
inefficiency, so the form of payment (cash or kind) does not matter.
In sum, Proposition 1 establishes mathematically the existence of reverse
share tenancy, i.e., that under our assumptions, sharecropping between a
poorer landlord and a richer tenant emerges as the dominant tenurial ar-
rangement. Conjecture 1 and Proposition 2 provide the empirically testable
implications of our theoretical model in the presence of cross-sectional data
among a population characterized by reverse tenancy sharecropping. Propo-
sition 3 establishes that, if we assume that kin contracts obviate the moral
hazard problem, then the share of the crop that goes to the landlord is
strictly greater in a kin contract than in a non-kin contract, providing a final
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testable implication. Finally, proposition 4 establishes that as property rights
get stronger, reverse tenancy sharecropping tends to disappear, providing a
key empirically testable proposition that will require longitudinal data for
proper testing.
4 Discussion
Given the model of the preceding section, it appears that sharecropping con-
tracts, which are still illegal in Madagascar but often take the form of reverse
share tenancy, emerge from the joint presence of asset risk and Marshallian
inefficiency. In so far as sharecropping’s illegality impedes reverse tenancy
contracting, the legal restriction injures poor, landed households by inducing
them to choose a suboptimal form of contracting out their land. Furthermore,
as property rights become more secure, reverse tenancy sharecropping will
tend to disappear, with poorer land owners benefiting from reduced Mar-
shallian inefficiency as a result of endogenously changing agrarian contracts.
Thus, there seems to be a good reason for the State to address the issues of
sharecropping and property rights enforcement.
The relevance of property rights questions is made greater by empirical evi-
dence that poor landowners may be most affected by insecure property rights.
Randrianarisoa and Minten (2001) mention that in 1993, percent of owned
land was titled among the richest income quintile but only 20 percent was for
the poorest quintile. Minten and Razafindraibe (2003) note that this inequity
becomes more acute when one looks at gender differences, with a man’s land
more than three times more likely to be titled than a woman’s. Poor and
female landowners thus appear to be the ones whose property rights are
the weakest, and so they are most likely the ones who could most benefit
from a strengthening of property rights. Randrianarisoa and Minten (2001)
also mention that “while an improvement of secure property rights that can
be established in a cheap way might benefit agricultural productivity and
efficiency in some regional settings, increasing attention should be paid to
include the poor in this titling process. It is shown that the rich hold rel-
atively more secure titles to land than do the poor and some studies have
shown that the rich might even get titles to the detriment of the poor.”
In this sense, if property rights are endogenous, an effort should be made to
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make them secure and therefore exogenous. Besley (1995), studying the link
between land rights and individual investment decisions in Ghana, similarly
argued that property rights could be endogenous but he concluded that one
should not necessarily see developing land rights as a universal panacea.
Platteau (1996) also argues that the beneficial effects of establishing private
property rights are overestimated, and that it would be better to rely on
informal mechanisms at the community level. Note that we are not arguing
for a particular institutional mechanism for making property rights secure
— e.g., titling by the State or community enforcement of customary access
rules — merely for securing property rights in order that poor landowners
do not choose relatively inefficient production arrangements as a means to
insure against asset loss. Our model introduces the important possibility of
endogenous change in the form of contract governing agricultural production.
In this setting, it appears that establishing such rights may well improve the
situation of poor but landed households.
5 Conclusion
Using a dynamic argument which combines the risk of asset loss with Mar-
shallian inefficiency associated with labor shirking by an imperfectly super-
vised tenant, we establish that sharecropping contracts will be chosen by the
landlord and derive comparative statics that are consistent with the stylized
facts of reverse tenancy sharecropping.
Our model also implies that reverse share tenancy will tend to disappear
as property rights get stronger. First, the State should make sharecropping
contracts legal, for even though the ban on share tenancy is not strictly en-
forced, it still creates some uncertainty for the households that are party to
such agreements. Second, the State should address the question of land rights
for all land owners, perhaps especially the poor.
This paper introduces a more encompassing theory of sharecropping that
can explain oft-observed reverse share tenancy, a phenomenon that defies
the canonical model of Cheung, Stiglitz, Newbery and their successors. As
such, it introduces a theory of sharecropping that could explain the institu-
tion’s existence wherever property rights are insecure.
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While this model explains the stylized facts well enough, there is still much to
be done on reverse share tenancy. For one, our model should be taken to data
and tested against other plausible explanations for the existence of reverse
share tenancy. For instance, Bellemare (2003) offers a preliminary model of
reverse share tenancy based on limited liability. Given apparent widespread
practice of reverse tenancy in different legal, political and economic environ-
ments, a general explanation of this phenomenon based on sound theory and
empirical validation should be sought.
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